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Ethics, Race, and Reform
Anthony V. Alfieri*
INTRODUCTION
Deborah Rhode is a highly acclaimed scholar and a distinguished public
servant.' Prolific in both academic scholarship and popular commentary, she is
the author of numerous books, articles, and essays on the law and the legal
profession. In an important convergence of her roles as a scholar and a public
intellectual, Rhode recently returned to the subject of the profession in a new
book titled In the Interests of Justice: Reforming the Legal Profession.2 Like
her prior work, In the Interests of Justice profoundly enriches the discourse of
ethics and professionalism. Equally important, taken as part of a larger
normative enterprise, it inspires others to pursue justice-seeking projects.
3
* Professor of Law and Director, Center for Ethics and Public Service, University of
Miami School of Law. I am grateful to Adrian Barker, Naomi Cahn, Dennis Curtis, John
Ely, Michael Fischl, Clark Freshman, Hilary Gershman, Bob Gordon, Ellen Grant, Patrick
Gudridge, Angela Harris, Geoff Hazard, Amelia Hope, Judith Resnik, Deborah Rhode,
Tanina Rostain, Austin Sarat, Bill Simon, Jonathan Simon, Karen Throckmorton, and Frank
Valdes for their comments and support.
I also wish to thank Shana Auguste, Porpoise Evans, Christina Farley, Ebony
Livingston, and the University of Miami School of Law library staff for their research
assistance, as well as Kirby Faciane, Mark Poe, and the editors of the Stanford Law Review
for their patient devotion.
This Essay is dedicated to Deborah Rhode.
1. Rhode recently served as the President of the Association of American Law Schools
and as senior counsel to the United States House Judiciary Committee on impeachment. See
Deborah L. Rhode, The Professional Responsibilities of Professional Schools, 49 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 24 (1999); see also DEBORAH L. RHODE, CONSTTTONAL GROUNDS FOR
PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT (1998); Deborah L. Rhode, Conflicts of Commitment: Legal
Ethics in the Impeachment Context, 52 STAN. L. REv. 269 (2000).
2. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL
PROFESSION (2000).
3. Rhode's founding work and leadership as Director of the Keck Center on Legal
Ethics & the Legal Profession at Stanford Law School inspired the development of
numerous legal ethics centers elsewhere, including the University of Miami School of Law's
Center for Ethics & Public Service.
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For many, the subject of contemporary justice in American law at the
hands of its heralded profession might prove a daunting project.4 Yet, for
Rhode, the subject affords an opportunity to enlarge a body of scholarship
already stunning in its breadth and virtuosity. Rhode's scholarship engages two
main fields of study: equality 5 and gender,6 and ethics 7 and professionalism.8 In
the Interests of Justice addresses primarily the latter. Rooted in
interdisciplinary literature, its genealogy combines multifarious antecedents.
On the politics of law and ethics, the book garners from the work of Richard
Abel,9 Robert Gordon, 0 William Simon," and David Willdns.' 2 On gender in
4. Rhode has previously taken up this theme. See Deborah L. Rhode, Access to
Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785 (2001) (discussing the legal profession's unwillingness
to take equal justice seriously at a conceptual, doctrinal, or political level); Deborah L.
Rhode, Symposium Introduction: In Pursuit of Justice, 51 STAN. L. REV. 867 (1999)
(pointing out inadequacies in the bar's prevailing ethical norms and resulting costs to the
profession and the public).
5. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, SPEAKING OF SEx: THE DENIAL OF GENDER EQUALITY
(1997); Deborah L. Rhode, Equal Rights in Retrospect, 1 LAW & EQUALITY 1 (1983);
Deborah L. Rhode, Sex-Based Discrimination: Common Legacies and Common Challenges,
5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 11 (1995); see also Deborah L. Rhode, WhatAbout
Poor Women?, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 23, 2000, atA17.
6. See Deborah L. Rhode, Gender and Professional Rules, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 39
(1994); Deborah L. Rhode, Missing Questions: Feminist Perspectives on Legal Education,
45 STAN. L. REV. 1547 (1993); see also Deborah L. Rhode, Feminism and the State, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1181 (1994).
7. See ETHICS IN PRACTICE: LAWYERS' ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION
(Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000); DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS
BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD (2d ed. 1998); DEBORAH L. RHODE & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD,
JR., THE LEGAL PROFESSION: RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION (3d ed. 1994); DEBORAH L.
RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS (3d ed. 2001); Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical
Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589 (1985); Deborah L. Rhode,
Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 665 (1994); see also Deborah L. Rhode,
Annotated Bibliography of Educational Materials on Legal Ethics, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
1029 (1998); Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Education: Professional Interests and Public Values,
34 IND. L. REV. 23 (2000).
8. See Deborah L. Rhode, Opening Remarks: Professionalism, 52 S.C. L. REV. 458
(2001); Deborah L. Rhode, Professionalism in Professional Schools, 27 FLA. ST. L. REV.
193 (1999); Deborah L. Rhode, The Professionalism Problem, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 283
(1998).
9. See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS (1989); LAWYERS: A CRITICAL READER
(Richard L. Abel ed., 1997); LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: AN OVERVIEV (Richard L. Abel & Philip
S.C. Lewis eds., 1995).
10. See Robert W. Gordon, Corporate Law Practice as a Public Calling, 49 MD. L.
REV. 255 (1990); Robert W. Gordon, The Ethical Worlds of Large-Firm Litigators:
Preliminary Observations, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 709 (1998); Robert W. Gordon, The
Independence ofLawyers, 68 B.U. L. REv. 1 (1988).
11. See WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS'
ETHICS (1998); William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1083 (1988); William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and
Professional Ethics, 1978 WIs. L. REV. 29.
12. See David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468 (1990);
David B. Wilkins, The Professional Responsibility of Professional Schools to Study and
[Vol. 54:13891390
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law and the profession, it culls from the research of Barbara Babcock 3 and
Judith Resnik.'4 On judgment and the neo-classical lawyer, it draws upon the
writing of Anthony Kronman.' 5 And in philosophy, it winnows from the texts
of David Luban.'
6
Rhode's publicly espoused normative commitments and her seamless
integration of interdisciplinary materials give her work a strongly reformist
cast. Indeed, for Rhode, In the Interests of Justice "is a book with a reform
agenda" calling for "fundamental changes in professional responsibility and
regulation." It strives, she declares, to crystallize "the challenges facing the
legal profession." To that end, it urges "a more searching analysis by both the
profession and the public about the points at which their interests diverge."'
7
That wide-ranging analysis encompasses the conditions of law practice and the
distribution of legal services, the advocate's role in the adversary system, the
regulation of lawyers' conduct, particularly the "economic, psychological, and
political constraints" of lawyer self-regulation, 8 and the structure of legal
education. The central premise of the book stems from the notion of the public
interest and Rhode's lament that it "has played too little part in determining
professional responsibilities."' 9
This essay takes up Rhode's premise of a core public interest in American
law and society, and seeks to join that interest to identity and community-based
reform movements. The essay is divided into three parts. Part I parses In the
Teach About the Profession, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 76 (1999); David B. Wilkins, Who Should
Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1992); David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati,
Reconceiving the Tournament of Lawyers: Tracking, Seeding, and Information Control in
the Internal Labor Markets of Elite Law Firms, 84 VA. L. REV. 1581 (1998).
13. See SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW: HISTORY, PRACTICE, AND THEORY
(Barbara Allen Babcock, Deborah L. Rhode, Nadine Taub, Ann Freedman, Rhonda Copelon
& Wendy Webster Williams eds., 2d ed. 1996); Barbara Allen Babcock, Defending the
Guilty, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 175 (1983).
14. See Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53U. CHI. L.
REV. 494 (1986); Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute
Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 211 (1995); Judith Resnik et
al., Individuals Within the Aggregate: Relationships, Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 296 (1996).
15. See ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER (1993); see also MARY ANN
GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS (1994); SOL M. LNowrrz & MARTIN MAYER, THE
BETRAYED PROFESSION (1994). Compare Marc Galanter, Lawyers in the Mist: The Golden
Age of Legal Nostalgia, 100 DICK. L. REV. 549 (1996) (examining Kronman's claim of
declining virtue -within the legal profession).
16. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988); DAVID
LUBAN, LEGAL MODERNISM (1994); THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS'
ETHICS (David Luban ed., 1983).
17. P. 3 (bemoaning lawyers' pursuit of "their own and their clients' interests at the
expense of broader public concerns").
18. Pp. 2-3 (describing the "self-regarding tendencies of self-regulating processes").




Interests of Justice for its guiding principles of reform. Part H links race and
reform to the criminal justice system, specifically with respect to the
prosecution and defense of racial violence. Part I connects identity and
community to lawyer-engineered reform strategies.
I. LIBERAL REFORM
In eight elegant chapters, In the Interests of Justice takes up the foremost
issues of the day in the American legal profession. Starting from the notion of
a modem profession, Rhode establishes both the predicate and the metric of the
public interest at once to guide and to gauge social progress. Unlike others
who hastily invoke the shibboleth of the public interest to advance the ends of a
group or an ideology, Rhode declines the crude embrace of self-interest and
elides the tendency to closet sociolegal definition with rigid demarcation.
Instead, she introduces the concept of the public interest in an open, other-
regarding sense, as an unbounded field to be mapped and redrawn
periodically. 20
The openness or receptivity to plural interpretation of the public and its
diverse interests amounts to more than a liberal gesture. For Rhode, this stance
comes as an article of faith tied to the twin belief in liberal dialogue and
feminist reasoning. Rendered favorably, liberal dialogue offers deliberative
modes of reciprocity and mutual respect in the service of shared contractarian
or communitarian ends. When confronted by difference (race, class, gender)
and the clash of identity, dialogue often falls into disagreement over the means
to and the wisdom of such ends. Less trusting of liberal legalism, feminist
reasoning strives to overturn hierarchical modes of logic based on power and
privilege in order to uncover and liberate suppressed forms of egalitarian and
inclusive reckoning. By turns pragmatic and contextual, feminist analysis
seeks to reintegrate suppressed forms of reasoning into the multiple texts (oral,
written, and symbolic) of everyday social practice to better create the
conditions for democratic dialogue. Feminist dialogue entails reciprocity and
mutuality deepened by an intuitive trust presumed to be beyond the atomistic
rationality of liberal individualism.
Rhode engages liberal and feminist methods to decipher the dominant
epistemological, interpretive, and discursive practices of the legal profession.
Deftly and tenaciously, she dismantles these practices and their normative
underpinnings discovering deep and perhaps irreconcilable conflicts between
the profession and the interests of the public. She locates this abiding and
perhaps insoluble conflict in the structure of the profession, its adversary
20. Rhode's unbounded definition of the public interest provokes Austin Sarat's charge
of analytic slippage into a "definitional and conceptual morass." See Austin Sarat, The
Profession Versus the Public Interest: Reflections on Two Reifications, 54 STAN. L. REV.
1489, 1495 (2002).
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system and juridical institutions, and its regulatory canons. To Rhode, neither
legal education nor professional reform may possess the forces necessary to
shed the weight of oppressive sociolegal structures that cabin the freedom and
efficacy of lawyers in serving the public interest.
Rhode initiates her conflict analysis broadly, surveying the countervailing
interests and perspectives of the public and the profession. 2' The survey
discloses "a profession permanently in decline." Citing "structural factors" of
discontent and an ever-widening "distance between professional ideals and
professional practice," Rhode bewails a "lost ... connection to the values of
social justice" exacerbated by "symbolic crusades and policy paralysis."22 For
the public and its popular culture, that normative forfeiture results in harsh
attributions of lawyer avarice, accusations of amoral advocacy, and democratic
incredulity about "the tension between money and justice." 3 For the
profession,24 such abdication causes consternation over the growing delivery of
legal services by nonlawyers,21 the declining pro bono commitment of lawyers
and law students,26 the rise of overzealous advocacy,27 and the continuing
underrepresentation of women and minorities in established status hierarchies. 28
To Rhode, these breaks in the idealized vision of lawyers explain the
"dispiriting disjuncture between current norms and traditional aspirations"2 9
and the consequent culture of discontent infecting the profession and the public.
21. Pp. 1-22.
22. Pp. 1-2.
23. Pp. 3-6, 7, 8.
24. Pp. 8-16.
25. P. 4; see Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional
and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1981)
(discussing constitutional standing of unauthorized practice doctrine); Ralph C. Cavanagh &
Deborah L. Rhode, The Unauthorized Practice of Law and Pro Se Divorce, 86 YALE L.J.
104 (1976).
26. Pp. 6, 13; see Deborah L. Rhode, Cultures of Commitment: Pro Bono for Lawyers
and Law Students, 67 FoREDAM L. REv. 2415 (1999) (discerning factors that encourage
voluntary and mandatory pro bono programs); Deborah L. Rhode, Social Responsibility and
the Legal Profession: Making Pro Bono Mandatory?, 9 RESPONSIvE COMMUNITY 41 (1999)
(citing the responsibility of bar associations to establish mandatory pro bono hours on a per
annum basis); Deborah L. Rhode, Essay: The Pro Bono Responsibilities of Lawyers and Law
Students, 27 WM. MrrcHELL L. REv. 1201 (2000) (outlining rationale for pro bono
involvement, the characteristics and experiences that foster such participation, and the
strategies most likely to increase it).
27. P. 7; see Robert W. Gordon, Why Lawyers Can't Just Be Hired Guns?, in ETHICS IN
PRACICE, supra note 7, at 42, 42-45.
28. P. 10; see David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black
Lawyers in Corporate Law Firms? An Institutional Analysis, 84 CAL. L. Rsv. 493 (1996)
(noting that pool limits and continuing racism play important roles in determining the




To repair these fissures, Rhode searches out the nature of lawyer
discontent.30 She examines the main sources of that discontent,3 their ties to the
structure of practice32 with its attendant free enterprise profit-impulse3 3 and
hollow meritocracy,34 and their susceptibility to alternative practice forms and
dynamics.35 She frames this analysis in the context of the adversary system,
36
tracing the evolution of the advocate's role,37 sketching the function of
partisanship38 and its coincidence with professional interests,39 and proffering
alternatives40 even in the face of unpopular causes and clients.4' Expanding
further, she fastens the adversarial precept to the American sporting theory of
justice,42 revealing its procedural foundations, 3 its dissonant account of witness
testimony, 4 and its dubious commitment to confidentiality.
4
Adroitly balancing analysis and critique, Rhode sharpens her conflict
inquiry in contemplating reform of the profession. Discounting the rhetoric of
reform,46 she charts the growth of the profession, 47 the rising costs of
litigation, 48 and the post-war surge of legal regulation.49 She contrasts this
burgeoning field with the inadequacy of alternative dispute resolution
30. Pp. 23-48; see Deborah L. Rhode, The Profession and Its Discontents, 61 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1335 (2000) (clarifying the sources of lawyers' discontent and the dynamics of race and




34. Pp. 38-44; see JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL
CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA (1976) (exploring the efforts of elite American lawyers in the
twentieth century to accommodate and resist the transformative forces of industrial
capitalism, urbanization, immigration, and economic change in the profession); Deborah L.
Rhode, Myths of Meritocracy, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 585 (1996) (demystifying claims of
equal justice and gender meritocracy within the legal profession).
35. Pp. 45-48.
36. Pp. 49-80.









46. Pp. 117-41; see Deborah L. Rhode, Too Much Law, Too Little Justice: Too Much
Rhetoric, Too Little Reform, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 989 (1998) (deriding strictures of
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procedures" and the insufficiency of nonlawyer conflict resolution services.-'
These deficiencies retreat against her bristling critique of institutional lawyer
regulation. 2 In mustering that criticism, Rhode scrutinizes the rationale for
regulation,53 especially in advertising and solicitation, 4 the logic of bar
admission5 5 and continuing legal education requirements 6 the crux of
competence and discipline standards, 57 the incidence of malpractice,58 and the
explosion in legal fees.59 Within this wide ambit of scrutiny, Rhode closely
inspects legal education, 60 evaluating its structure,61 its commitment to
diversity,62 its methods and priorities,63 its professional responsibility
curriculum,64 and finally its professional values and pro bono opportunities.
6 5
50. Pp. 131-35. Compare Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073
(1984) (arguing that settlement sacrifices important public values), with David Luban,
Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619 (1995) (suggesting that
the settlement process can fulfill the values of openness, legal justice, and advance the
creation of public goods).
51. Rhode approves multidisciplinary practice and cross-professional collaboration.
Additionally, she calls for "greater access to mediation and alternative dispute resolution
programs." Pp. 19, 135-41; see Deborah L. Rhode, Professionalism in Perspective:
Alternative Approaches to Nonlawyer Practice, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 701
(1996) (exploring the contributions and limitations of recent bar debates over nonlawyer
practice); Deborah L. Rhode, The Delivery of Legal Services by Non-lawyers, 4 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHics 209 (1990) (surveying possibilities and identifying considerations relevant to
the unauthorized practice of law that will better serve the public interest within a broader
social, economic, and political context).
52. Pp. 143-83.
53. Pp. 144-47; see Deborah L. Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A Functional
Perspective on Professional Codes, 59 TEX. L. REV. 689 (1981) (linking ethics codes to the
professional goals of achievement and recognition).
54. Pp. 147-49.
55. Pp. 150-55; see Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential,
94 YALE L. J. 491 (1985) (assailing the premises and practices of the legal profession's




59. Pp. 168-83; see CAMERON STRACHER, DOUBLE BILLING: A YOUNG LAWYER'S TALE
OF GREED, SEX, LIES, AND THE PURSUIT OF A SWIVEL CHAIR (1998).
60. Pp. 185-206; see Deborah L. Rhode, Into the Valley of Ethics: Professional
Responsibility and Educational Reform, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139 (1995)
(denouncing curricular marginalization of professional responsibility courses and
institutional denigration of moral responsibility pedagogy); Deborah L. Rhode, Whistling
Vivaldi: Legal Education and the Politics of Progress, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE
217 (1997) (condemning the underrepresentation of women in academic positions of greatest
reward, the subordination of women's issues in the core curriculum, and the devaluation of








Rhode concludes that structural reform of the profession must overcome
substantial but "by no means insurmountable" obstacles. The focal points for
such reform are the public and the profession. For Rhode, the public must gain
greater voice in and control over the content and enforcement of legal processes
and ethics. Likewise, lawyers faithful to the profession must "assume greater
moral responsibility for the consequences of their professional conduct and for
the adequacy of their own regulatory processes and working conditions."66
Carefully distilled, Rhode's guiding principles of reform celebrate
professional autonomy, moral accountability, liberal citizenship, and egalitarian
politics. Professional autonomy asserts prudential independence from clients,
public and private institutional entities, and the marketplace. 7 Moral
accountability extends the other-regarding responsibilities of practice to courts,
third parties, and the public.68 Liberal citizenship affirms the reciprocal
obligations of shared civic governance that "reinforce ethical values in the
service of social justice."69 And egalitarian politics assures equal access to
justice and equal opportunity in the workplace.70 To test these principles, the
next section links race and reform in the prosecution and defense of racial
violence.
II. RACE AND REFORM
For more than two centuries, race has vexed the American legal profession
in matters of both law and politics. Although mindful of this troubling history,
In the Interests of Justice addresses the interwoven chronicles of race and the
profession only in passing. To be sure, Rhode has engaged the subject with
considerable vigor elsewhere. 71 Others have likewise exhibited vitality in
studying race in legal education and in the profession, particularly as it impacts
upon the treatment of clients and the role of lawyers. 72 The strands of race,
66. Pp. 207-12, 213.
67. P. 213 ("Individual clients' concerns are entitled to deference, but not to the exalted
position they now occupy in the profession's moral universe.").
68. P. 213 ("Lawyers' primary responsibility should run to the system ofjustice and to
the core values of honesty, fairness, and good faith that sustains it.").
69. Pp. 209, 213 (directing lawyers "to consider all the societal values at issue in
particular practice settings").
70. P. 209 ("The public deserves reasonable access to legal assistance and to legal
processes that satisfy basic standards of fairness, integrity, and efficiency.").
71. See, e.g., Rhode, The Professionalism Problem, supra note 8, at 317 (emphasizing
guiding principles of diversity and racial difference in the American legal profession).
72. See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The Underrepresentation of Minorities in the Legal
Profession: A Critical Race Theorist's Perspective, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1005 (1997); David B.
Wilkins, Do Clients Have Ethical Obligations to Lawyers? Some Lessons from the Diversity
Wars, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 855 (1998); David B. Wilkins, Identities and Roles: Race,
Recognition, and Professional Responsibility, 57 MD. L. REv. 1502 (1998); David B.
Wilkins, Partners Without Power? A Preliminary Look at Black Partners in Corporate Law
Firms, 2 J. INST. STUD. LEGAL ETHICS 15 (1999); David B. Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the
1396 [Vol. 54:1389
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identity, and role extend throughout contemporary American jurisprudence
entwining the movements of Critical Race TheoryT LatCrit Theory,74 and
Queer Legal Theory.75 Similar threads increasingly emerge in the clinical
practice literature of lawyers dedicated to civil rights and criminal law
advocacy.76 Neither clinical nor jurisprudential movements, however, make a
sustained effort to fuse racial identity and professional responsibility. Yet,
situated at the intersection of legal theory and practice, the study of race and
reform in advocacy and ethics implicates considerations of professional role
First Amendment: Should a Black Lawyer Represent the Ku Klux Klan? 63 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 1030 (1995); David B. Wilkins, Rollin' on the River: Race, Elite Schools, and the
Equality Paradox, 25 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 527 (2000); David B. Wilkins, Social Engineers
or Corporate Tools? Brown v. Board of Education and the Conscience of the Black
Corporate Bar, in RACE, LAW AND CULTURE: REFLECTIONS ON BROWN v. BOARD oF
EDUCATION 137 (Austin Sarat ed. 1997); David B. Wilkins, Two Paths to the Mountaintop?
The Role of Legal Education in Shaping the Values of Black Corporate Lawyers, 45 STAN.
L. REV. 1981 (1993); David B. Wilkins, On Being Good and Black, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1924
(1999) (reviewing PAUL M. BARRETT, THE GOOD BLACK: A TRUE STORY OF RACE IN
AMERICA).
73. Critical Race Theory "focuses on the relationship between law and racial
subordination in American society." Kimberl6 Crenshaw, A Black Feminist Critique of
Antidiscrimination Law and Polities, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE
195, 213 n.7 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990). See generally, JUAN F. PEREA, RICHARD
DELGADO, ANGELA P. HARRIS & STEPHANIE WILDMAN, RACE AND RACES: CASES AND
RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA (2000); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS
THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller & Kendall
Thomas eds., 1995); CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY
(Francisco Valdes, Jerome McCristal Culp & Angela P. Harris eds., 2002); CRITICAL RACE
THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 2d ed. 2000);
CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 1997); Angela P. Harris,
Foreword: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REV. 741 (1994) (introducing
the first Symposium devoted specifically to Critical Race Theory in an American law
review); see also ANGELO N. ANCHETA, RACE, RIGHTS, AND THE ASIAN AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE (1998).
74. See Enid Trucios-Haynes, Why "Race Matters:" LatCrit Theory and Latinalo
Racial Identity, 12 LA RAZA L.J. 1 (2001); THE LATINO CONDITION: A CRITICAL READER
(Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1998); Symposium, LatCrit Theory: Naming and
Launching a New Discourse of Critical Legal Scholarship, 2 HARv. LATINO L. REV. 1
(1997); Symposium, Lawyering in Latinalo Communities: Critical Race Theory and
Practice, 9 LA RAZA L.J. 1 (1996).
75. See WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW (1997); Nancy
D. Polikoff, Am I My Client?: The Role Confusion ofa Lawyer Activist, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 443 (1996); William B. Rubenstein, Queer Studies II.- Some Reflections on the Study
of Sexual Orientation Bias in the Legal Profession, 8 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 379 (1998).
76. See Christine Zuni Cruz, [On the] Road Back In: Community Lawyering in
Indigenous Communities, 5 CLINICAL L. REV. 557 (1999); Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V.
Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REV. 443 (2001); Bill
Ong Hing, Raising Personal Identification Issues of Class, Race, Ethnicity, Gender, Sexual
Orientation, Physical Disability, and Age in Lawyering Courses, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1807
(1993).
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and responsibility for civil rights77 as well as criminal7s lawyers. Prior work in
my own hand,79 and its accompanying criticism,"0 struggles to explicate those
considerations. That work usefully frames the exposition of Rhode's guiding
principles of reform in the context of the criminal justice system, especially
with regard to the prosecution and defense of racial violence.
The study of racial violence in law and society begins with an examination
of identity, its embodiment in narrative, and its representation in advocacy.
Racial representation in the narratives of advocacy animates both the
prosecution and the defense of racial violence. It also informs the ethics of the
lawyering process, giving rise to colorblind and color-coded norms of
representation. Those competing norms mold our vision of the good lawyer in
cases of racial violence. Embedded within that vision are familiar axioms of
lawyer moral nonaccountability and race neutrality, and crabbed valuations of
client dignity and community. The purpose of exploring racial identity,
racialized narrative, and race-coded representation is to reconcile those axioms,
and the corollary duty of effective representation, with the dignitary interests of
clients and communities of color.
Reconciliation may be pursued by investigating race-conscious,
community-regarding methods of representation gathered from existing
prosecution and defense practices. The practices reveal recurrent lawyer
tendencies in constructing racial identity, deploying racialized narrative, and
configuring race-coded strategies of representation. Prosecutors and defenders
daily construct racial identity in their advocacy tactics. The tactics may include
target profiling, plea bargaining, jury selection, trial objections, sentencing
recommendations, and even appellate argument. Although distinct, the tactics
77. See ERIc Y. YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JusTIcE: CONFLICt AND RECONCILIATION IN
POsT-CIvIL RIGHTs AMERICA (1999); Eric K. Yamamoto, CriticalRace Praxis: Race Theory and
Political Lawyering Practice in Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MICH. L. REv. 821 (1997).
78. For debate on the role of criminal lawyers, see David Luban, Are Criminal
Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729 (1993)(marshaling a strong justification for the
criminal defense function); William Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, 91 MICH. L.
REv. 1703 (1993) (rejecting a more strident adversarial ethic in criminal defense).
79. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1301 (1995);
Anthony V. Alfieri, (Er)Race-ing an Ethic ofJustice, 51 STAN. L. REV. 935 (1999); Anthony V.
Alfieri, Lynching Ethics: Toward a Theory of Racialized Defenses, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1063
(1997); Anthony V. Alfieri, Prosecuting Race, 48 DUKE L.J. 1157 (1999); Anthony V. Alfieri,
Prosecuting Violence/Reconstructing Community, 52 STAN. L. REv. 809 (2000); Anthony V.
Alfieri, Race-ing Legal Ethics, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 800 (1996); Anthony V. Alfieri, Race
Prosecutors, Race Defenders, 89 GEO. L.J. 2227 (2001); Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Trials, 76
TEX. L. RE'. 1293 (1998).
80. For criticism, see Robin D. Barnes, Interracial Violence and Racialized Narratives:
Discovering the Road Less Traveled, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 788 (1996); Richard Delgado,
Making Pets: Social Workers, "Problem Groups," and the Role of the SPCA-Getting a
Little More Precise About Racialized Narratives, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1571 (1999); Abbe Smith,
Burdening the Least of Us: "Race-Conscious" Ethics in Criminal Defense, 77 TEX. L. REv.
1585 (1999); Christopher Slobogin, Race-Based Defenses-The Insights of Traditional
Analysis, 54 ARK. L. REV. 739 (2002).
1398 [Vol. 54:1389
ETHICS, RACE, AND REFORM
share a common lexicon of race captured in the imagery and rhetoric of deviance
and inferiority.
Deviant imagery and rhetoric suffuse cases of racially motivated violence,
black-on-white and white-on-black. Consider, for example, the 1991 state
criminal and 1994 federal civil rights prosecutions of Lemrick Nelson and
Charles Price in New York.8 The prosecutions followed four days of interracial
street-fighting between blacks and Hasidic Jews spurred by the motorcade
crash death of a seven-year-old black child, Gavin Cato, and the stabbing death
of a twenty-eight-year-old Australian Hasidic scholar, Yankel Rosenbaum, in
the Crown Heights section of Brooklyn. State prosecutors charged Nelson with
second degree murder and manslaughter. A four-week state trial ended in
acquittal. Federal prosecutors subsequently charged Nelson and Price with
civil rights violations of a Reconstruction era public accommodations statute,
claiming interference with Rosenbaum's federally protected public activities.1
2
The twenty-four day trial resulted in convictions and prison sentences of 235
months for Nelson and 262 months for Price.83
At the federal trial, United States District Judge David Trager from the
outset announced his "intention to empanel 'a moral jury that renders a verdict
that has moral integrity.' 8 4 Judge Trager explained: "[t]his trial is occurring for
the same reason Rodney King's trial occurred, the second trial, because the first
81. See Alfieri, Race Trials, supra note 79, at 1323-39; Jane Fritsch, 2 Win New Trial in
Killing During Brooklyn Unrest-Jury Selection Faulted in Crown Hts. Case, N.Y. TIMEs,
Jan. 8, 2002, at A19; see also United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2002); United
States v. Nelson, 90 F.3d 636 (2d Cir. 1996), cert denied, 520 U.S. 1122 (1997); United States
v. Nelson, 68 F.3d 583 (2d Cir. 1995); People v. Nelson, 647 N.Y.S.2d 438 (N.Y. Crim. Ct.
1995).
82. See 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B) (2002). Federal prosecutors also charged Price with
aiding and abetting Nelson's violation of 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B) and engaging in conduct
in further violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2002). See Nelson, 277 F.3d at 169-70. The Second
Circuit described Price's address to a crowd of community residents as "angry and
aggressive," remarking that he "transformed [the crowd] into an explosive mass." Id. The
court attributed the following statements to Price:
"[1]f it was a black man that did this they would have been gone to jail instead of being
pulled inside of an ambulance for safekeeping.'
"We can't take this anymore. They're killing our children. The Jews get everything they
want. The police are protecting them."
"What are we going to do about this? Are we going to take this anymore?"
"Let's get the Jews" and "Eye for an eye. No justice no peace.'
Id. at 170 (citations omitted).
83. Id. at 173.
84. ld. at 171. The Second Circuit speculated that Trager was "responding to the




jury did not represent the community."85 To ensure a "religiously and racially
mixed jury" representative of the community and to safeguard the moral
integrity of its verdict, Trager took three "unusual steps."86 First, he denied
Nelson and Price's Batson challenge 7 to the prosecutors' use of five out of nine
(55%) of their peremptory challenges to strike African American candidates
from the jury pool.8 Second, he denied Nelson and Price's for-cause challenge
to a Jewish juror (Juror 108) in spite of the fact that the juror "had expressed
grave doubts about his ability to be objective." 9 And third, upon excusing an
African American empaneled juror for illness, he bypassed the first alternate
white juror, removed a second white juror from the panel, and selected-out of
order-an African-American juror and a Jewish juror (Juror 108) from a list of
alternates to fill the two open places on the jury.90 Both Nelson and Price
appealed their convictions challenging the prosecutors' application of the
public accommodations statute9' and Trager's jury-selection procedures.92
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
concluded that Trager committed reversible error in empaneling a biased juror
by "open manipulation of the jury selection process to secure a racially and
85. Id. at 171-72. Tragerremarked:
I have an agenda here which I have made very clear from the very beginning, to end up with
a jury that represents the community that will have moral validity; and if there is a hung
jury, that itself will be a statement to both sides about both what is the process and the
problems are with our society. To me, justice will be served.
Id. at 172.
86. Id.
87. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (establishing constitutional standard
for purposeful discrimination in exercise of peremptory challenges during jury selection).
88. African Americans by comparison comprised only 30% of the jury pool. Nelson,
277 F.3d at 172, 199 (noting Trager's "efforts to prevent the final jury from containing too
many African Americans and too few Jews").
89. Id. at 199. Juror 108 admitted to the district court that, "he was 'pretty sensitive' to
issues affecting the Jewish community and that he was 'disappointed' by the outcome of
defendant Nelson's state murder trial." At a second round of voir dire, the district court
expressly asked Juror 108 to "look into [his] heart and ask [him]self whether [he] fe[lt]
personal emotional internal pressures that would make it such that [he] couldn't give the
defendant[s] here a fair trial." Juror 108 answered "I don't know, I honestly don't know."
Id. (citation omitted).
90. Id. at 199-200.
91. The Second Circuit concluded that 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B) was constitutional as
applied to Nelson and Price and that the evidence was sufficient to show that both
defendants possessed the requisite two-fold intent under the statute. Id. at 207-13.
92. See Hiroshi Fukurai, Social De-Construction of Race and Affirmative Action in
Jury Selection, 11 LA RAZA L.J. 17 (1999) (examining public perceptions of affirmative jury
structures mandating racial quotas to engineer racially heterogeneous juries in criminal trials,
specifically the jury de medietate linguae, the Hennepin model, the social science model, and
a peremptory inclusive selection method); William T. Pizzi & Morris B. Hoffman, Jury
Selection Errors on Appeal, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1391 (2001) (contending that jury
selection irregularities caused by peremptory challenges should be discounted for reasons of
harmless error and waiver).
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religiously balanced jury."" The Second Circuit held that Trager fundamentally
"erred in empaneling a juror whose answers at voir dire clearly displayed actual
bias," and in seating a jury that "failed both the Sixth Amendment's and the
Due Process Clause's requirement of impartiality. '9 4 Accordingly, the court of
appeals vacated the district court's judgment of conviction and remanded the
case for a new trial before a properly chosen, impartial jury.95
Standing alone, Trager's "highly unusual" and improper "effort to achieve
a racially and religiously balanced jury" likely would be consigned to the
footnotes of constitutional law and criminal procedure casebooks.9 6 The
"crucial complication" posed by his selection methods for the Second Circuit
and for reformist purposes pertains not simply to the actions of the district
judge, but to the conduct of counsel for the prosecution and the defense.
Indeed, notwithstanding the "controversial methods" employed,97 Nelson and
Price's counsel expressly consented to the court-initiated plan for empaneling
Juror 108 on the jury, despite raising an original for-cause challenge to Juror
108 and reiterating an objection to the district court's failure to dismiss him.
Nelson and Price as well consented to the empaneling scheme on the record.98
Equally grave, federal prosecutors approved the scheme. In fact, on appeal,
they argued that the defendants' express consent constituted a waiver,
effectively extinguishing their Sixth Amendment and due process rights.
The Second Circuit rejected the argument of federal prosecutors. The court
held that the defendants' consent to the empaneling plan "did not constitute a
valid waiver of their claim that the jury before which they were tried was
improperly partial." 99 Reasoning that parties are not free, even with a trial
93. Nelson, 277 F.3d at 169.
94. Id. at213.
95. The Second Circuit discarded as meritless Price's "claim that the causal link
between his speech at the scene of the accident that led to the rioting and violence and the
eventual attack on Rosenbaum is insufficient, as a matter of law, to support his aiding and
abetting liability for that attack." Pointing to trial evidence, the court held that it was
"unquestionably sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that Price's speech at the scene of the
accident" not only "transformed a crowd that was neither unified nor particularly out of
control into an explosive mass," but also "was a cause in fact of the eventual assault." Id. at
213.
96. Id. at 207.
97. Trager exclaimed:
I will not allow this case to go to the jury without 108 as being a member of that jury, and
how that will be achieved I don't know. It may well be just by people falling out. It may
well happen, in which event I propose never to make any findings on this issue, and if I can I
would seal the whole discussion because I see it serving no one's interest. I am not sure I can
get away with that. I don't know if the press will allow it, but I don't think it would serve the
public's interest to have this discussion go on the record, and especially, if I don't make any
findings and I hope that I will not have to make any findings.
Id. at 200.
98. Id. at 172. Defense counsel explicitly stated that this method of jury selection
"would be agreeable to the defendants." Id.
99. Id. at 213.
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court's imprimatur, to empanel a jury of a precise "racial and religious mix,"
the court of appeals concluded that a waiver of a juror's impartiality is
unacceptable when obtained by the promise of seating a jury marked by
"'desirable' racial characteristics."''0 Civil litigants, the court explained, are not
at liberty to agree that an action "should be heard by a jury composed only of
members of their own racial or religious groups." Agreements of this kind are
"impermissible in light of the [federal] courts' special commitment to equal
protection."' 01 Moreover, the court added, such agreements run afoul of both
congressional and Supreme Court commitments to 'race neutrality in jury
selection." 1 0 2 Neutrality, the court proclaimed, enjoins parties from "bending"
the judicial system to suit their private "racial and religious preferences."'03
That injunction invalidates the novel race- and religion-based jury selection
procedures and the unusual jury reconstruction plan in Nelson whether
100. The Second Circuit expressed "substantial doubts about whether the right to be
tried by an impartial tribunal js waivable, at least once a for-cause challenge has been made."
Id. at 205. Even if waivable, the court continued, "the defendants' acceptance of an improper
jury selection plan, only one part of which involved the empaneling of Juror 108, does not
constitute a valid waiver," adding that "the right to an impartial fact finder might be
inherently unwaivable." Id. Ultimately, according to the court of appeals, the exchange was
improper "because the benefit to be received by the defendants in connection with the
exchange-the replacement by the court of a white juror with an African American juror
solely on the basis of race-was itself improper." Id. at 211. That "impropriety invalidated
any waiver of the defendants' complaint concerning Juror 108's bias that might otherwise be
found in their acceptance of the district court's larger plan." Id.
101. Id. at 213. The court noted that the "violation of equal protection that occurs
when a person is excluded from ajury on the basis of his race (or religion) would seem only
to be made more serious when the exclusion occurs at the behest not just of the parties but of
the court itself, whose duties under the Equal Protection Clause are particularly strong." Id.
at 207.
102. Id. at 208 (citation omitted). The court opined that the "significance of a jury in
our polity as a body chosen apart from racial and religious manipulations is too great to
permit categorization by race or religion even from the best of intentions." Id. at 207-08.
103. Id. at 209. At oral argument on appeal, federal prosecutors urged endorsement of
the defendants' purported waiver and ratification of Trager's jury selection scheme 'just this
once," while conceding that court-permitted "waivers of racially and religiously tested
jurors.., should be forbidden in the future, regardless of the parties' consent." Id. The
Second Circuit recounted the following colloquy:
The Government: There have been cases that this Court has essentially decided that certain
procedures were improper and would not be condoned in the future on a prospective basis.
That's happened. And this might be such a case.
The Court: How do we do that? Do we say that in this case [we affirm the conviction below]
but in the future, if the prosecution agrees to something like this, it is acting at its peril
because in the future we will reverse?
The Government: Sounds good.
The Court: What?
The Government: Sounds good.
The Court: Sounds better to you than it does to me, maybe.
The Government: Read it over a few times. You'll get used to it, Judge.
Id. at 209-10.
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instigated by the parties' °4 or by the trial judge.05 Even, as here, when the
judge's motives are "undoubtedly meant to be tolerant and inclusive rather than
bigoted and exclusionary," the Second Circuit maintained that such race-
conscious actions succumb to constitutional infirmity. 106
Absent from the substantive repudiation of the jury selection procedures in
Nelson is an indication that either the trial judge or counsel (for the government
or the defense) violated any canon or rule of ethics. The Second Circuit is
wholly silent on the subject of ethical breach or censure. This moral silence
pervades much of the history of the Nelson prosecution and, unsurprisingly, its
defense. It is the coded silence of a race trial.
Previously, in several studies of race trials, I pointed to the racialized
litigation strategies of the Nelson prosecutors and defenders in both federal and
state proceedings, citing pretrial adult transfer and recusal motions, as well as
trial arguments and statements. I argued that the federal prosecutors' motion to
stand Nelson on trial as an adult, and thus subject him to mandatory sentencing
guidelines, imbued young black male identity with a caste vision of
irredeemable inferiority and inscribed in law a stigmatizing narrative of
immutable deviance that belied the social reality of Nelson's age, educational
and family background, and unremarkable criminal record. Furthermore, I
contended that the defense motion for judicial recusal'017 and the exculpatory
claim of diminished capacity, alluding to Nelson's behavioral dysfunction and
Price's drug-addled incompetence, similarly evoked a history of racial animus
and inferiority, and echoed a race-embroidered narrative of moral depravity.08
To cure the dignitary harm spawned by racialized trial strategies, I
proposed a race-conscious community ethic of professional responsibility for
prosecutors and defenders in cases of racial violence. 09 Carved from the norms
of liberal citizenship, the ethic urged formal, rather than covertly instrumental,
consideration of the role of identity in charging, investigation, pretrial
publicity, trial tactics (jury selection, opening statements, direct and cross
examinations, objections, and closing arguments), and sentencing. Formal,
overt consideration of racial identity, I asserted, enhanced lawyer moral
accountability for the dignitary harm that deforms the character of defendants
and diminishes the standing of their communities. Heightened public
104. Id. The court declared that "it is beyond peradventure that the racial and religious
reconstruction of the jury that occurred in this case could not constitutionally have been
achieved at the instigation of the parties." Id. at 207.
105. Id. The court also mentioned that "what the district court could not allow the
parties to do, it also could not do of its own motion even with the consent of the parties." Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 171 (noting "the district court (Trager, J.), no doubt responding to the
politically charged nature of the case and to the controversial State court acquittal of Nelson,
made clear his intention to empanel 'a moral jury that renders a verdict that has moral
integrity').
108. See Alfieri, Race Trials, supra note 79, at 1323-39.
109. See Alfieri, Race Prosecutors, Race Defenders, supra note 79, at 2253-55, 2261-64.
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consideration, I speculated, also may serve to prevent identity-based interracial
violence and hate crimes, and moreover, to encourage the participation of
communities of color in the criminal justice system through local churches,
neighborhood associations, health clinics, and schools. Citizen participation in
tarn might advance the interests of individual dignity, collective equality, and
interracial reconciliation. To that end, borrowing from well-settled traditions of
lawyer independence and moral activism, I prodded prosecutors and defenders
to deploy identity-based litigation strategies gingerly, allowing race-
consciousness to inform the lawyer's advocacy, counseling, and advisory roles
while mitigating harm to persons and communities of color. The upshot of this
prodding, I fear, is the racialized imbroglio of U.S. v. Nelson. Hope of allaying
that fear compels a return to Rhode's vision of reform.
III. IDENTrrY, COMMUNrY, AND REFORM
The task of linking identity, community, and reform in the criminal justice
system is best begun by revisiting Rhode's guiding principles of reform. Rhode
values autonomy, accountability, citizenship, and equality. Autonomy pertains
to clients, institutions, and the market. Accountability runs to courts, third
parties, and the public. Citizenship relates to the reciprocal obligations of
democratic governance and service. And equality goes to freedom from
oppressive socioeconomic arrangements and to the egalitarian exercise of
political rights. Each of these principles struggles in the encounter with the
identity and community intricacies of U.S. v. Nelson. That struggle comes not
from a lack of familiarity with the complexities of identity and community."'
To her credit, Rhode shows fluency in navigating both elite-engineered and
community-based reform fostered by identity groups, though unlike Gerald
Lopez,"' Paul Tremblay," 2 and Lucie White,"3 she has declined to develop a
110. See Deborah L. Rhode, Can a Lawyer Insist on Clients of One Gender?, NAT'L
L.J., Dec. 1, 1997, at A21; Deborah L. Rhode, Anti-Gay Prejudice Persists in Legal
Workplace, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 16, 1996, at A15; Deborah L. Rhode, Solomon Amendments
Curb Academic Freedom, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 1, 1998, at A21.
111. See GERALD P. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF
PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992); Gerald P. Lopez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice:
Seven Weeks in the Life of a Rebellious Collaboration, 77 GEO. L.J. 1603 (1989); Gerald P.
Lopez, Training Future Lawyers to Work With the Politically and Socially Subordinated:
Anti-Generic Legal Education, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 305 (1989).
112. See Paul R. Tremblay, Acting "A Very Moral Type of God": Triage Among Poor
Clients, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2475 (1999); Paul R. Tremblay, A Tragic View ofPoverty Law
Practice, 1 D.C. L. REV. 123 (1992); Paul R. Tremblay, Rebellious Lawyering, Regnant
Lawyering, and Street-Level Bureaucracy, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 947 (1992); Paul R. Tremblay,
Toward a Community-Based Ethic for Legal Services Practice, 37 UCLA L. REV. 1101
(1990).
113. See HARD LABOR: WOMEN AND WORK IN THE POST-WELFARE ERA (Joel F.
Handler & Lucie White eds., 1999); Lucie White, On Abolitionist Critiques, "Homeless
Service" Programs, and Pragmatic Change, 19 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 431 (2000);
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full-blown ethic of community advocacy for such outsider groups. No single
ethic, however, seems likely to resolve the question presented by the
consensual racial and religious jurymandering in U.S. v. Nelson.
Applied to Nelson, the question of jurymandering breaks down into three
parts: peremptory challenges, for-cause challenges, and race or religion-
conscious empaneling. Once again, the first part refers to Trager's denial of
Nelson and Price's Batson challenge to federal prosecutors' use of 55% of their
peremptory challenges to strike African American candidates from the jury
pool. Recall that African Americans comprised only 30% of that pool. The
second part concerns Trager's denial of Nelson and Price's for-cause challenge
to Juror 108, a Jewish juror who had repeatedly acknowledged doubts about his
own strained objectivity. The third part involves Trager's decision, upon
excusing an African American empaneled juror, to bypass the first alternate
white juror, remove a second white juror from the panel, and select-out of
order-an African American juror and Juror 108 from a list of jury alternates.
Again, further complicating this intentional decision is the fact that the parties
and their counsel gave "knowing consent" to the empaneling of a jury
"explicitly selected, in part, on the basis of race and religion."'" 4
Rehearsing the ethical mandates of the federal courts, 15 the American Bar
Association," 6 the U.S. Department of Justice, and assorted advisory groups"
17
is unlikely to invalidate this outpouring of consent. But engrafting Rhode's
guiding principles of reform on the conduct of the Nelson prosecutors and
defenders may at least illuminate the wrenching trade-offs brokered during
identity and community-based advocacy. 18 Although this cluster of principles
lacks the coherence and specificity that accompanies fuller embellishment, it
may prove more demanding in directing socially responsible conduct than
conventional ethical standards." 9 As such, it may furnish a significant check on
Lucie E. White, Raced Histories, Mother Friendships, and the Power of Care:
Conversations with Women in Project Head Start, 76 CHI.-KENT. L. REv. 1569 (2001);
Lucie E. White, The Transformative Potential of Clinical Legal Education, 35 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 603 (1997).
114. See United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2002) (nullifying consent
obtained in exchange for the improper empaneling of a jury chosen partly on the basis of
race and religion).
115. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
116. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1983); MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (2002); STANDARDS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1993).
117. See NATIONAL DISTRICT ATrORNEYs ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL PROSECUTION
STANDARDS (1991); UNrrED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYs'
MANUAL (1998).
118. Rhode views professional regulatory structures and bar ethical codes as an
inadequate source of guidance. Pp. 20-21 (mentioning that the "codes offer an unsatisfying
mix of vague directives (charge 'reasonable' fees), moral exhortation (volunteer pro bono
service), and minimal prohibitions (refuse to assist criminal conduct)").




the adversarial excesses of distortion and deception prevalent in trials of racial
violence. Curbing character and community distortion in race trials may help
improve public accountability of the profession and restore public confidence
in the criminal justice system.
Consider first the federal prosecutors' use of 55% of their peremptory
challenges to strike African American candidates from a jury pool out of which
they comprised only 30% of the total. Barely outside constitutional
proscription, the prosecutors seem fettered to a vision of public accountability
defined by prevention, deterrence, and retribution, rather than a sense of
common racial citizenship and equal participatory rights to enjoy civic
governance.
Next consider defenders' for-cause challenge to Juror 108 on the conceded
ground of suspect impartiality. Bolstered by repeated juror admissions during
two rounds of voir dire, the challenge enunciates a fair-minded version of
accountability to the law, the court, and the public. That accountability is
bound up in the notion of impartial citizenship and equal treatment unsullied by
bias.
Last consider prosecutors' and defenders' express consent to the
empaneling of a jury chiefly on the basis of race and religion. Safely outside
sanction, this joint act of consent strikes an indelicate balance between
professional autonomy and public accountability in race cases. The act itself
shows meager autonomy from either the client or the state. Its accountability
runs narrowly in the same direction, pointedly away from third party rights to
jury representation and open public scrutiny of jurymandering. In this way, its
reciprocal import for the larger community-exchanging white-for-black and
black-for-white-seems more likely to institutionalize racial sentiment than
banish it from adjudication.' 20 Unchecked by cross-racial dialogue and
egalitarian sympathy, that sentiment may limit equal access to and participation
in the trial of race cases. Erecting such an ongoing hindrance to civic access
and democratic participation in the juridical institutions of the state operates to
"compromise accepted moral values,"' 2' a result Rhode counsels against. It is
this cardinal objection that may prove fatal to a race-conscious community
ethic of professional responsibility for both prosecutors and defenders.
Long debated, race-consciousness is hardly accepted. Facially
incompatible with our colorblind, constitutional tradition but enduring in
cultural and sociolegal practice, it suffers inconsistent construction in advocacy
and adjudication. That inconsistency upsets the meaning of impartiality and the
logic of adversarial justice. Interpretive ruptures in the accepted meaning of
120. See Ian F. Haney Lopez, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New
Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717 (2000) (constructing an organizational
theory of racism capable of reconciling statistical evidence of judicial discrimination that
systematically harms minority groups with individual judges' proclaimed lack of conscious
discriminatory intent in decision making).
121. P. 18.
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racial impartiality and systemic disruptions in the adversarial race-ing of trial
tactics risk inducing prosecutorial ambivalence and defender anxiety in race
cases. Those are the risks of making public progress toward racial equality.
CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, Rhode's thesis of a core public interest intrinsic to
American law and society offers a thin but hopeful reed of promise for the
reform of racialized advocacy and adjudication within the criminal justice
system. The difficulty lies in grappling with elite lawyer-engineers over the
leadership of such reform efforts and in binding together alliances among
identity and community-based movements. Doubtless Rhode's guiding
principles of autonomy, accountability, citizenship, and equality will facilitate
both political endeavors. To be sure, neither politics nor law can reconcile the
competing party, state, and community interests at stake in the criminal and
civil rights trials of racial violence. However, they can open and enliven
normative dialogue in diverse forums. Dialogues of racial reform present the
chance of moving an "unorganized and uninvolved"'22 public toward
community activism and mobilization on behalf of civil and criminal justice
initiatives. For Rhode and other agitators of the public good, 23 the current
"challenge lies in refocusing [public] disaffection in more constructive
directions and in identifying ways to bridge the gap between professional and
public interests."' 24 Rhode deserves our praise and our help in forging that
bridge.
122. P. 7.
123. See Deborah L. Rhode, Squeezing the Public Good, 86 A.B.A. J. 120 (2000).
124. P. 8.
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